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The first two decades of law reform related to cross-border bankruptcy
are the paired story of the UNCITRAL Model Law (Chapter 15 in the
United States) and the EU Insolvency Regulation (the EU Reg).1 Both seek
to create an architecture whereby a court located at a debtor’s center of
main interest (COMI) can coordinate the insolvency of a debtor with assets
and operations in multiple jurisdictions. The Model Law focuses on the
automatic recognition of foreign representatives, and the creation of an
ancillary proceeding to administer local assets and claims or transfer them
for administration in the main case.2 The EU Reg creates a structure where
the main case, “opened” at the debtor’s COMI, administers the case, while
secondary winding up proceedings are opened in jurisdictions where the
debtor has an establishment. 3 Both statutes focus on centralizing
administrative power in the “main case.” Centralized, or at least
coordinated, administration should facilitate rescue (reorganization) where
efficient, and allow for a value maximizing liquidation or going-concern
sale where necessary.
Law reform efforts have paid relatively less attention to how assets
should be administered in the main case pending at the debtor’s COMI.4
Indeed, short of establishing a norm of cooperation with the main case, the
same can be said with regard to ancillaries. Governing law has been
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1. See U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER
INSOLVENCY WITH GUIDE TO ENACTMENT AND INTERPRETATION, U.N. Sales No. E.14.V.2
(2014) [hereinafter MODEL LAW]; 11 U.S.C. § 1501 et seq.; Council Regulation 2000/1346, On
Insolvency Proceedings, 2000 O.J. (L 160) 1 (EC) [hereinafter EU Insolvency Regulation].
2. MODEL LAW, supra note 1, arts. 15–17 (recognition), 20–21 (effect of recognition and
discretionary relief).
3. EU Insolvency Regulation, supra note 1, arts. 3–4.
4. It would be wrong to say that no attention was paid. Jay Westbrook has written
thoughtfully on the topic of how to administer assets for distribution (Jay Lawrence Westbrook,
Universal Priorities, 33 TEX. INT’L L.J. 27 (1998)) and lays out an approach to the priority rules
applicable in the main proceeding. John Pottow too has given serious thought to the issue. John A.
E. Pottow, Greed And Pride In International Bankruptcy: The Problems Of And Proposed
Solutions To “Local Interests”, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1899 (2006). Indeed, there are similarities
between Pottow’s approach and mine that will be discussed below. The issue is only just being
addressed seriously within law reform efforts for the first time.
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assumed to be domestic bankruptcy law in the main, and a subset of
domestic bankruptcy law in the ancillary jurisdiction, though with a norm
of deference to and cooperation with the coordinating court (comity). Law
reformers and harmonizers have not ignored domestic bankruptcy law. On a
parallel track, UNCITRAL has promulgated the Legislative Guide on
Insolvency that provides a template for modernizing domestic bankruptcy
law.5 The Legislative Guide does not, however, address cross-border issues.
As such, the next decade, or at least the next round, of law reform is
likely to be devoted to developing and harmonizing the procedures for
administering the main case pending at the debtor’s center of main interest
in a manner that facilitates cooperation in cross-border cases.6 In particular,
the goal of these efforts should be to adopt measures that: (1) facilitate
cooperation by ancillary courts; (2) minimize the effects and incentives for
forum shopping; and (3) minimize the conflicts of interest faced by those
charged with administering assets in multiple jurisdictions. I would like to
further suggest that the success of these efforts is going to turn largely on
the ability to distinguish harmonized and global bankruptcy procedures
from locally determined substantive rights—finding the proper scope for lex
fori (law of the forum) and lex situs (law of the location of the property or
cause of action) respectively.
Modified universalism has animated the first generation of bankruptcy
harmonization, and operated based on the hope that differences of outcome
in individual cases that resulted from differences among local laws would
be tolerated under the principle of comity. Under modified universalism, an
ancillary court is encouraged to follow the direction of the main court, so
long as the main case is in a jurisdiction with a reasonable or modern
bankruptcy system. Deviations from a territorial distribution under local
law should be tolerated based on the assumption that, over time, national
gains and losses would be a “rough wash,” and that, in the aggregate,
“transactional gain” would outweigh the cost.7
This approach has worked reasonably well, particularly where common
law countries are involved, and there is a willingness to apply a relatively
strong norm of comity.8 But, where differences of outcome have seemed
5. U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON INSOLVENCY
LAW, U.N. Sales No. E.05.V.10 (2004) [hereinafter UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVEGUIDE].
6. I have made this suggestion elsewhere. Edward J. Janger, Universal Proceduralism, 32
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 819 (2007); Edward J. Janger, Virtual Territoriality, 48 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 401 (2010); Edward J. Janger, Reciprocal Comity, 46 TEX. INT’L L.J. 441 (2011).
7. Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism in Global Insolvencies: Choice of Law
and Choice of Forum, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 457 (1991) [hereinafter Westbrook, Theory and
Pragmatism].
8. In re Maxwell Commc’n Corp. plc, [1992] B.C.C. 372; Cambridge Gas Transp. Corp. v.
Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Navigator Holdings Plc, [2007] 1 A.C. 508 at 16;
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significant (Qimonda) 9 or secured creditors are involved (Treco) 10 this
willingness to cooperate has broken down. In those cases, the need to
protect local creditor expectations has trumped the norm of international
cooperation. Concerns about local entitlements have trumped comity.
Problems have also emerged where corporate groups are involved, and it
has proven difficult to determine the relationship between the cases pending
at the group’s center and cases opened by subsidiaries in foreign
countries.11 As a result, there has been consistent uncertainty about whether
a secondary or ancillary court will cooperate with the court of the main
proceeding, or apply its own law to local assets in order to protect local
creditor expectations.
The comity-based approach relies on courts to enforce foreign
judgments notwithstanding differences of treatment. The problem with this
lies not with the courts, that often do cooperate ex post, but with the parties
themselves. Where differences of treatment exist along with uncertainties
about enforcement, opportunities for arbitrage and gaming arise. These
opportunities for a party to litigate or bargain for an increased distribution
can delay administration and frustrate the goal of global coordination, even
when cross-border cooperation is clearly in the firm’s best interest. Indeed,
as Judge Allan Gropper has pointed out elsewhere, the need to avoid the
threat of local secondary or ancillary proceedings (or “secondaries”) and the
cost of seeking recognition has simply led debtors in many cases to pay the
non-financial creditors who are beyond the reach of the forum court.12 This
functional territorial blackmail can be expensive, limits the ability of global
companies to restructure, and undercuts the goal of equal treatment.
In the last few years a second approach has emerged, focusing on
choice-of-law rather than comity. A comity-based approach demands
cooperation from the ancillary court and acquiescence to different
distributional outcomes. A choice-of-law approach has the potential to
make cooperation a two-way street. Under a choice-of-law (or virtually
territorial) approach, the main case pending at the debtor’s COMI would
respect the territorial priorities and distributions that would have been
McGrath v. Riddell (In re HIH Cas. & Gen. Ins. Ltd.), [2008] UKHL 21 at 36, 1 W.L.R. 852
(H.L.) 863 (Lord Hoffmann).
9. Jaffé v. Samsung Elec. Co., Ltd. (In re Qimonda), 737 F.3d 14 (4th Cir. 2013); In re
Qimonda AG, 462 B.R. 165 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2011).
10. In re Treco, 240 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2001).
11. Re Enron Directo Sociedad Limitada (July 4, 2002) (unreported); Daisytek ISA Limited,
[2004] BPIR 30; MG Rover, [2005] EWHC (Ch) 874; Case C-341/04, Eurofood IFSC Ltd., 2006
E.C.R. I-3854.
12. Allan Gropper, The Payment of Priority Claims in Cross-Border Insolvencies, 46 TEX.
INT’L L.J. 559, 569 (2010) (“U.S. debtors in Chapter 11 reorganization cases with substantial
assets . . . abroad . . . invariably try to pay in full not only foreign priority creditors but all foreign
creditors, with the possible exception of foreign financial creditors (usually banks) . . . .”).
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applied had a case been opened in the secondary jurisdiction. This approach
minimizes (and may eliminate) differences in treatment, and along with it,
the incentives and opportunities for gaming.
Instead of imposing its own priority rules, the main might respect
foreign priorities, to mirror a hypothetical territorial distribution. Framed as
a procedure, John Pottow has labeled this approach a synthetic secondary.13
Framed as a choice-of-law principle, I have called it “virtual
territoriality.”14 Framed as a corollary to the principle of comity, I have also
called it “reciprocal comity.”15 Whatever the name, the vision is the same:
allow the case pending at the debtor’s COMI to distribute assets according
to a hypothetical territorial distribution.
As a practical matter, this approach was pioneered in the Collins &
Aikman case. Collins & Aikman Europe SA was an automobile parts maker
whose European operations were centered in the United Kingdom but
previously had operations and subsidiaries in other EU countries.16 The
administrator promised certain foreign creditors that if they refrained from
opening secondary cases, they would be given the distribution they would
have received had they opened the local case. The UK court permitted this,
after some common law hoop-jumping, even though it was arguably
inconsistent with Article 4 of the EU Reg’s requirement that the forum
court apply its own bankruptcy law.17 This approach has been followed in
other cases in the United Kingdom,18 and current proposed amendments to
the EU Reg would expressly validate this approach.19 Similarly, the report
of Working Group V following the Fourth UNCITRAL International
Insolvency Law Colloquium in December 2013 suggested that
13. John A. E. Pottow, A New Role for Secondary Proceedings in International Bankruptcies,
46 TEX. INT’L L.J. 580, 584 (2011).
14. Janger, Virtual Territoriality, supra note 6, at 408.
15. Janger, Reciprocal Comity, supra note 6, at 456.
16. Re Collins & Aikman Europe SA, [2006] EWHC (Ch) 1343.
17. EU Insolvency Regulation, supra note 1, art. 4. Article 4 requires the “country of opening”
to apply its own bankruptcy law (subject to a number of exceptions). It provides in pertinent part:
“Save as otherwise provided in this Regulation, the law applicable to insolvency proceedings and
their effects shall be that of the Member State within the territory of which such proceedings are
opened, hereafter referred to as the ‘State of the opening of proceedings’.” Id.
18. See, e.g., In re MG Rover, [2005] BPIR 1162 (Ch) (Eng.); see also Barr v. Charterhouse
Group Int’l, Inc. (In re Everfresh Beverages, Inc.), 238 B.R. 558 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995); In re
Artimm, S.r.L., 335 B.R. 149 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2005) (carve-out for U.S. pension fund claim
from U.S. assets being sent to Italy for Italian distribution).
19. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending
Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 On Insolvency Proceedings, COM (2012) 744 final (Dec.
12, 2012) [hereinafter Proposal to Amend the EU Insolvency Regulation]. For a discussion of the
proposed amendments, see Bob Wessels’s contribution to this volume, Contracting Out of
Secondary Insolvency Proceedings: The Main Liquidator’s Undertaking in the Meaning of Article
18 in the Proposal to Amend the EU Insolvency Regulation, 9 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 63
(2014).
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UNCITRAL’s work regarding corporate groups and directors’ obligations
might also use “choice-of-law” to facilitate cross-border coordination.20 It
also listed the harmonization of choice-of-law principles in cross-border
bankruptcies as among its highest priorities for future work.21
This idea—using choice of law principles to implement virtual
territoriality—is motivated by a principle that might be called “global best
interests.” In a coordinated case, the distributional baseline, for the purposes
of negotiation and perhaps, someday, cramdown, would be determined by
calculating the amount that would be received in a hypothetical territorial
liquidation. Local claims would be entitled to a minimum distribution based
on their local priorities, though limited to the assets that would have been
available in a territorial case had one been filed. The practical task imposed
on courts (and administrators) is to calculate the hypothetical territorial
distribution. This task places great pressure on the ability to locate claims
and assets for the purpose of distribution.
In this Article, I will seek to make two related points. First, I will
explore some of the difficulties with locating claims and assets, but argue
that ultimately the task is not too hard. Second, I will try to explain why it is
worth the trouble, by articulating a principle of global best interests that can
offer a practical basis for allocating value in, and a normative basis for,
pursuing global reorganizations.
I. IMPLEMENTING CHOICE-OF-LAW IN CROSS-BORDER
CASES
In previous articles, I have argued for an approach to cross-border
bankruptcies called “universal proceduralism.”22 Universal proceduralism
contemplates a centrally administrated bankruptcy case located at the
debtor’s COMI that handles distribution and other matters of substance
according to a choice-of-law principle that I call “virtual territoriality.”23
This approach is situated within the academic debate between the
competing approaches of “cooperative territoriality” advocated by Lynn
LoPucki and “modified universalism” pioneered by Jay Westbrook. 24
Current law reform efforts have been animated by a commitment to
modified universalism, and, up until now, the differences between modified
universalism and universal proceduralism have not mattered much as a
20. U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Working Group V (Insolvency Law), Rep. on its 44th
Sess., July 7–25, 2014, para. 5, U.N. Doc A/CN.9/798 [hereinafter Forty-fourth Session Working
Group Report].
21. Id. para. 24.
22. See articles cited supra note 6.
23. Id.
24. Lynn Lopucki, The Case for Cooperative Territorialism in International Bankruptcy, 98
MICH. L. REV. 2216 (2000); Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism, supra note 7.
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practical matter. This is because, with a few key exceptions, the broad
architecture contemplated by the UNCITRAL Model Law, the UNCITRAL
Legislative Guide, and the EU Regulation are broadly consistent with either
approach. The next phase of reform—addressing the problem of corporate
groups—however, will place the differences in high relief.
The model law is silent with regard to the law to be applied in main and
ancillary cases. The assumption, of course, is that the forum court (main or
ancillary) will apply its own law. But this leaves open a question, familiar
to first-year law students in the United States confronted with the Erie
decision: does that law include the forum’s own choice-of-law principles?25
To put it another way, under its domestic bankruptcy law, does a forum
court have the authority to apply foreign law to a legal question? If the
answer is yes, then a further question arises: which choice-of-law questions
are determined by choice of forum or lex fori, and which choice-of-law
questions are determined by the location of the cause of action itself or lex
situs? The EU Insolvency Regulation and the Legislative Guide are not
silent on this point, and the approach they follow has caused some practical
problems. 26
A. CHOICE-OF-LAWUNDER THE EUREGULATION AND
LEGISLATIVEGUIDE
The current approach to choice-of-law in cross-border bankruptcies is
hobbled by an anachronistic view of the distinction between substance and
procedure. 27 It is axiomatic that a forum court should apply its local
procedural law to a case. Forum choice determines choice of procedure. By
contrast, the governing law with regard to substantive rights is determined
by the location of the claim, or, where property based claims are involved,
by the location of the property. Bankruptcy law has historically been
viewed as procedural, and, therefore, choice of forum has dictated the
choice of applicable bankruptcy law.
25. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Klaxon v. Stentor, 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
26. Article 4 of the EU Reg (EU Insolvency Regulation, supra note 1, art. 4) and
recommendations 31–34 of the Legislative Guide (UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note
5, recs. 31–34) do create problems for Universal Proceduralism, and they are the focus of the
discussion below.
27. Paradoxically, in the US, the “bankruptcy is procedural” argument has been seized by
bankruptcy minimalists to argue that domestic bankruptcy law should be limited to the procedures
necessary for administering the debtor’s assets. THOMAS JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF
BANKRUPTCY LAW (2001); Charles W. Mooney Jr., A Normative Theory of Bankruptcy Law:
Bankruptcy As (Is) Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 931 (2004). By contrast, in the
cross-border bankruptcy context, the procedural nature of bankruptcy law has been embraced by
bankruptcy maximalists to enforce centralization in the main case. See, e.g., Jay Lawrence
Westbrook, Locating the Eye of the Financial Storm, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1019 (2007).
186 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 9
But the formal designation of bankruptcy law as procedural breaks
down under modern practice. Rules relating to priority, treatment of
contracts, avoidance, and governance all reside within modern bankruptcy
statutes, and the effects of those rules are quite substantive.28 Nonetheless,
the modified universalist clings to the historical classification of bankruptcy
as procedural and embraces the category creep. If bankruptcy law is
formally categorized as procedural, then forum choice determines
applicable law. Westbrook has argued, for example, that the major aspects
of bankruptcy law—control, priority, avoidance and bankruptcy policy—
should all be determined by forum choice.29 The existing instruments, as
well, continue to treat bankruptcy law as a procedural black box.30
The Legislative Guide embraces a broad view of lex fori concursus.
Recommendation 30 states clearly that the forum court should apply its
private international law (choice-of-law) rules to determine the validity of
claims: “The law applicable to the validity and effectiveness of rights and
claims existing at the time of the commencement of insolvency proceedings
should be determined by the private international law rules of the State in
which insolvency proceedings are commenced.”31
However, the forum’s bankruptcy law will govern the treatment of
those claims in an insolvency proceeding. Recommendation 31 states: “The
insolvency law of the State in which insolvency proceedings are
commenced (lex fori concursus) should apply to all aspects of the
commencement, conduct, administration and conclusion of those
insolvency proceedings and their effects.”32
There are a number of exceptions to this rule—for labor claims,
settlement of payments and a few others—but the rule is clear, the forum’s
bankruptcy law is treated as unitary. Indeed, Recommendation 34 brings the
point home, stating, “[a]ny exceptions . . . should be limited in number and
be clearly set forth or noted in the insolvency law.”33
28. 11 U.S.C. § 507 (priority), § 365 (executory contracts), §§ 544–550 (avoidance), §§ 321–
333 (governance) (2012).
29. Westbrook, Locating the Eye of the Financial Storm, supra note 27, at 1021 (“The close
integration among bankruptcy rules and policies in each jurisdiction applies to the big four of
bankruptcy policy: control, priority, avoidance, and reorganization policy.”). See also Westbrook,
Theory and Pragmatism, supra note 7; Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Choice of Avoidance Law in
Global Insolvencies, 17 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 499 (1991).
30. UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 5, recs. 30–34; EU Insolvency Regulation,
supra note 1, arts. 3–4.
31. UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVEGUIDE, supra note 5, rec. 30.
32. Id. rec. 31.
33. Id. rec. 34.
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The EU Reg takes a similar approach. Article 4 provides:
Save as otherwise provided in this Regulation, the law applicable to
insolvency proceedings and their effects shall be that of the Member State
within the territory of which such proceedings are opened, hereafter
referred to as the ‘State of the opening of proceedings’.34
Again, there are exceptions, and the list is somewhat longer than in the
Legislative Guide, but the basic approach is that the forum court will apply
its own bankruptcy law, lock, stock, and barrel.
This approach has led to a paradox under both the EU Reg and the
Model Law. On the one hand, a debtor’s foreign assets and claims are dealt
with in the “main” case where the law of the COMI is applied for
distributional and other purposes. On the other hand, local creditors are free
to (and the administrator may need to) open a secondary or ancillary case.
Under the Model Law, the ancillary court would need to decide whether to
administer assets locally or send them to the main for central
administration.35 This decision would require a further determination as to
whether local creditor interests were “sufficiently” or “adequately
protected.” 36 Under the EU Reg, the secondary proceeding would
necessarily be a winding-up proceeding applying local law.37 Presumably,
only residual assets would be available for central administration.
This has created a difficult dynamic, particularly in Europe. Rescue,
going concern sale, or coordinated liquidation, can often only be
accomplished if one can avoid opening secondaries. Cases like Collins &
Aikman managed a workaround, but such a result would not have been
possible without the flexibility of a common law court.38 The Model Law
does not by its terms empower a court to engage in a choice-of-law inquiry,
so unless such power exists within local law, the baseline for “adequate
protection” would be local entitlements.
B. PROPOSAL FORCHANGE
The Collins & Aikman approach has gained additional vitality as a
result of pending proposals to amend the EU Reg.39 Those proposals, if
adopted, would codify a version of the Collins & Aikman approach. The
proposed amendments to the EU Reg give the administrator in the main
case the power to make a binding promise to foreign creditors that he would
34. EU Insolvency Regulation, supra note 1, art. 4(1).
35. 11 U.S.C. § 1521(a) (2012).
36. 11 U.S.C. § 1521(b). Chapter 15 uses the term “sufficient protection.” Article 21 of the
Model Law uses the term “adequate protection.”
37. EU Insolvency Regulation, supra note 1, art. 3(3)
38. Re Collins & Aikman Europe SA, [2006] EWHC (Ch) 1343 (Eng.). See supra text
accompanying note 16.
39. Proposal to Amend the EU Insolvency Regulation, supra note 19.
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match their hypothetical territorial distribution. 40 Second, the proposal
would give the administrator in the main case the power to offer that
promise as a defense to the opening of a secondary.41
The proposed amendments achieve this result in two statutory steps.
First, proposed Article 18(1) allows the liquidator to make a binding
promise to comply with a hypothetical territorial distribution, and allows
the court in the main proceeding to honor that promise:
The liquidator appointed by a court . . . . may . . . give the undertaking that
the distribution and priority rights which local creditors would have had if
secondary proceedings had been opened will be respected in the main
proceedings. Such an undertaking . . . shall be enforceable and binding on
the estate.42
Second, to give teeth to this promise outside the main jurisdiction, the
liquidator has standing to appear in a foreign jurisdiction to oppose the
opening of a secondary. In a case where the undertaking described above
has been given, the court in the non-main jurisdiction is strongly
importuned not to open a case:
Upon request by the liquidator in the main proceedings, the court referred
to . . . shall postpone the decision of opening or refuse to open secondary
proceedings if the opening of such proceedings is not necessary to protect
the interests of local creditors, in particular, when the liquidator in the
main proceedings has given the undertaking referred to in Article 18 (1)
and complies with its terms.43
While these two provisions are framed as procedural, they give the
liquidator the power to make a binding promise that might otherwise have
been beyond her power. There should be no mistake that the effect of this is
substantive. Courts will be required to interpret and enforce these
“undertakings,” and in order to do so, it will be necessary to make a
substantive determination—to calculate “the distribution . . . which local
creditors would have had if secondary proceedings had been opened.”44
The European Union is not the only place where this approach is
catching on. UNCITRAL has recognized that in its current work on
corporate groups and officers and directors’ obligations, the ability to
calculate and enforce a hypothetical territorial distribution through the use
of a synthetic secondary may facilitate cross-border administration of a
40. Id. para. 28(a)(1).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. para. 34(2).
44. Id. para. 28(a)(1).
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bankruptcy case.45 It has also listed a project to harmonize choice-of-law
rules as an avenue for future work.46
Finally, the need for reform is highlighted by the inconsistent approach
to foreign law courts have followed using a comity-based approach. For
example, in Condor, the foreign representative of a Saint Kitts and Nevis
debtor exercised its foreign avoidance powers in a Chapter 15 case.47 In that
case, a foreign insurance company opened an ancillary case in the United
States, seeking to avoid a fraudulent conveyance to its U.S. subsidiary.48
The Fifth Circuit held that, while Chapter 15 does not grant a foreign
representative the U.S. Bankruptcy Code’s avoidance powers, the foreign
administrator could pursue an avoidance action using the avoidance powers
available under the law of the main jurisdiction, Nevis. By contrast, in
Qimonda, U.S. licensees of a German corporation were able to claim
protections available under the U.S. law limiting the debtor’s power to
reject intellectual property licenses even though the patents were held by a
German licensor, and German law, it was argued, would have allowed
rejection.49
The synthetic secondary/virtual territoriality approach embodied in the
proposed amendments to the EU Reg might alleviate the tension and
inconsistency embodied in the recent cases. However, these proposals also
turn modified universalism on its head by validating a virtual territorial
approach to distribution. In order to determine whether the promise is being
honored, it will be necessary to locate claims, assets, applicable bankruptcy
priorities, and applicable non-bankruptcy property rights. This is not
impossible, but it may be complicated. How to do so is discussed in the
next section.
C. LOCATINGCLAIMS ANDASSETS FOR THE PURPOSE OF
DISTRIBUTION
Harmonizing choice-of-law rules for the purpose of distribution might
seem like a daunting task. However, some of the work has been done
already. The Global Principles for Cross-border Insolvencies of the
45. Forty-fourth Session Working Group Report, supra note 20, para. 16.
46. Id. para. 24.
47. Tacon v. Petroquest Res. Inc. (In re Condor Ins. Ltd.), 601 F.3d 319, 323 (5th Cir. 2010).
48. Id. at 320. See also 11 U.S.C. §§ 1519–1521 (2012).
49. Jaffé v. Samsung Elec. Co., Ltd. (In re Qimonda), 737 F.3d 14 (4th Cir. 2013). Global
Rule 11 of the ALI/III Principles would apply the law of the “seat” of the IP owner (licensor) to
govern the IP license. AM. LAW INST., Global Rules on Conflict-of-Laws Matters in Insolvency
Cases, in TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY: GLOBAL PRINCIPLES FOR COOPERATION IN
INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY CASES ann. at 200, r.11, (2012), available at
http://www.iiiglobal.org/component/jdownloads/finish/557/5932.htm [hereinafter Global Rules].
The court in Qimonda does not do a private international law analysis, however, so the question is
not definitively answered.
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American Law Institute and International Insolvency Institute offer a
template. The choice-of-law “Annex” to the ALI/III Principles articulates a
set of choice-of-law principles for cross-border cases.50 In this section, I
will set forth the contours of the Annex approach—not to endorse it, but
simply to point out that a broadly intuitive approach to locating claims and
assets will work for the vast majority of questions faced by a bankruptcy
court. Broadly speaking there are four types of assets that concern us: (1)
real property; (2) tangible movables; (3) intangibles; and (4) property
whose ownership is registered in a registry. There are three types of claims
against the debtor that matter: (1) secured claims—in rem; (2) claims
against the debtor that are entitled to priority; and (3) claims against the
debtor that would be entitled to pari passu treatment.
1. Assets
The Annex suggests the following rules for locating assets. Real
property is located where it is physically located, unless there is a registry,
in which case it is located where the registry is located.51 Tangible movable
property is also located where it is physically located, unless it is in transit,
has been moved in a forum shop, is mobile goods, or is registered.52 If it is
in transit, it is located where it is going.53 If it was recently moved in a
forum shop it is located where it used to be.54 Registered property, tangible
or intangible, is located where the registry is located.55 These are common
sense rules, and predictable. Indeed, they track the approach followed in the
United States by Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code prior to the
2000 amendments.56 While there are rules for locating intellectual property
rights, labor contracts, executory contracts and stock,57 the Global Rules do
not have a general rule for locating intangibles. This would be a task for the
UNCITRAL project. One possibility would be to locate them where the
debtor is located (as does the Uniform Commercial Code). Another
approach might be to use general rules for locating contracts at the site of
the transaction, to the extent there are rules for doing that. In short, there
are a few intricacies, but the obstacle, if any, to a virtually territorial
approach is not the ability or inability to articulate predictable principles for
locating assets.
50. Global Rules, supra note 49.
51. Id. r. 6.
52. Id. r. 7, 8.
53. Id. r. 7.2(b).
54. Id. r. 14.
55. Id. r. 6, 8.
56. UCC § 9-301 (pre-2000).
57. Global Rules, supra note 49, r. 10–11, 19–20.
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2. Claims
The Annex suggests that claims should be located where the debtor is
located. 58 As a general rule, this makes sense, but it requires a bit of
unpacking and depends on the type of claim that we are talking about. The
overarching principle of universalism is that a creditor knows where a
debtor is located when they extend credit and can take that into account
when they loan. For most debt contracts, this rule works. Indeed, to the
extent that a pari pasu claim is involved, the creditor could presumably
have asserted that claim against the debtor wherever assets are located and a
foreign judgment would be recognized. The result is the same as treating
the claim as if it were located at the COMI. So far, the exercise of locating
claims is reasonably straightforward. For secured claims, however, the
property aspect of the transaction will often be governed by the location of
the collateral, not the debtor.59 Where priorities are involved as well, the
location of the debtor rule breaks down and the analysis becomes more
complicated. We will take these situations in order.
a. Secured Claims
Once an asset has been located, the inquiry becomes simple, up to a
point. Assets located in a particular jurisdiction are governed by the
property law and secured credit law of that jurisdiction. However,
bankruptcy law often alters the treatment of secured creditors, and thus one
must ask whether the bankruptcy law that governs the property rights of
secured parties is going to be the bankruptcy law of the jurisdiction where
the asset is located or the bankruptcy law of the jurisdiction where the
debtor is located. A territorialist would choose the former. A universalist,
the latter. A virtual territorialist would say that the main proceeding ought
to treat the assets located in a foreign jurisdiction in the same manner as
they would have been treated in a territorial case had one been opened.
58. Id. r. 9.
59. The bankruptcy treatment of the locally determined property right could, as a practical
matter, be handled under the bankruptcy law of the COMI or the jurisdiction where the property is
located. This is an important distinction. Whether the stay limits the rights of the secured creditor,
whether the property can be used or sold by the trustee, and the nature of adequate protection are
all bankruptcy questions, and determining the applicable bankruptcy law may be as important as
determining the applicable property law. In theory, this is one place where the modified
universalist and the universal proceduralist would appear to part ways. The modified universalist
would give universal effect to the bankruptcy law of the COMI. The universal proceduralist would
allow the local assets to be administered under local bankruptcy law (whether in a secondary or in
the main). As a practical matter, however, the difference may not be as great as it appears. The EU
Reg excludes most in rem rights from coverage by the choice of law rule in Article 4. EU
Insolvency Regulation, supra note 1, art. 4. The Legislative Guide advocates a broader approach
to lex fori, but as a practical matter, it is comity rather than choice of law that will determine
whether an ancillary or secondary court will acquiesce to the (foreign) main court’s assertion of
jurisdiction over local assets.
192 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 9
This latter approach is synthetic, but the other approaches might give
rise to forum shopping by debtors for better bankruptcy treatment, or create
an incentive to open a secondary that might endanger cooperation and
coordination. The synthetic approach is followed by the Annex. Rule 15.1
states that “insolvency proceedings shall not affect the rights in rem of
creditors or third parties . . . in respect of . . . assets . . . which are situated
within the territory of another state at the time of the opening of
proceedings.”60 In other words, if a secondary is opened, then assets located
in that jurisdiction will be governed by the bankruptcy law of that
jurisdiction. Therefore, symmetry would require that, if no secondary is
opened, the main case should determine the treatment of the secured
creditor based on what would have happened had a secondary been
opened.61
b. Priority Claims
Jay Westbrook has written thoughtfully about the treatment of priority
claims in cross-border cases. He advocates an approach called “universal
priority.”62 Under that approach, the priority rules of the debtor’s COMI
would govern regardless of the location where the claim arose. The
difficulty with this approach is that some priorities are regulatory and local
in nature, such as employee priorities, or priorities linked to the local law of
fraud or local tort law. To apply foreign priorities might disturb the
incentives built into the local remedial scheme. As an alternative, wearing
his modified universalist hat, Westbrook suggests universal priority with
cross filing. In other words, the local priorities might be applied in the
ancillary, and then again in the main. This has the difficulty of potentially
proliferating priorities, and also granting a windfall to a creditor who might
earn a double priority. The virtual territorialist would instead situate the
contract claim based on ordinary choice-of-law principles, locating the site
of the contract, and granting the priority that would apply (if any) under
local law. Again, this is the approach followed by the ALI/III principles.
Principle 35 states that:
A claim that is governed by the law of a state other than that in which
insolvency proceedings are taking place should in principle have only the
priority it would have in a strictly territorial process conducted in the state
60. Global Rules, supra note 49, r. 15.1.
61. Here, the Annex deviates from the modified universalist approach. The modified
universalist would not do this. They would ask the ancillary to cooperate in administering secured
claims according to the bankruptcy law of the debtor’s COMI.
62. Westbrook, Universal Priorities, supra note 4.
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whose law governs the insolvency proceedings, and restricted to assets
located in that state.63
It is important to note, however, that this result is not mandated by the
Model Law or consistent with the Legislative Guide’s recommendations on
governing law.
c. Pari Passu Claims
For general unsecured claims, the modified universalist and the virtual
territorialist reach the same result. To the extent that the claim is a recourse
claim against the debtor, an unsecured creditor could pursue that claim in
any jurisdiction where the debtor had assets by domesticating the judgment
and seizing assets to the extent permitted by that jurisdiction’s laws. The
same would be true if a secondary were opened in that jurisdiction. Local
creditors might claim in the secondary, but foreign creditors as well could
claim through the foreign representative. The difference between the virtual
territorialist and the modified universalist disappears where pari passu
claims are involved, and the III/ALI principles recognize this through
Principle 34 which mandates recognition and allowance of claims across
jurisdictions.
One place where the Annex fails to achieve clarity is with regard to
bilateral contracts. Rule 19 of the Annex states that the law governing
bilateral contracts shall be the “jurisdiction of opening.” 64 This rule is
problematic, as the governing law may change depending on whether the
contract rights are being enforced in the “main” or the “secondary,” each of
which has its own “jurisdiction of opening.” This is precisely the confusion
that led to the dispute in Qimonda. 65 The modified universalist would
resolve this dispute by saying that the bankruptcy treatment of an executory
contract will be handled by the law applicable to the main case. The virtual
territorialist would choose instead the law of the jurisdiction to which the
contract has its greatest relation—the situs of the transaction. For what it’s
worth, in Qimonda the result of both inquiries would likely have been
Germany rather than the United States.66
The point here is, again, not to choose which result is right, but to
suggest that the exercise of choosing the applicable law is not futile.
However, where the two inquiries diverge, virtual territoriality would limit
the incentive to forum shop for the favorable rule.
63. Global Rules, supra note 49, r. 35.
64. Id. r. 19.
65. See Jaffé v. Samsung Elec. Co., Ltd. (In re Qimonda), 737 F.3d 14 (4th Cir. 2013); In re
Qimonda AG, 462 B.R. 165 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2011).
66. See supra text accompanying note 49.
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d. Corporate Groups
A second place where territorialism reasserts itself, even for unsecured
non-priority claims is if the debtor has created foreign subsidiaries.
Subsidiaries limit the assets against which local creditors may claim. The
existence of territorial subsidiaries simplifies the choice of law inquiry in
some ways and complicates it in others. With regard to legal non-
bankruptcy treatment and calculation of a hypothetical territorial
distribution, the existence of a subsidiary actually simplifies matters. Assets
and claims are more likely to be located in the same jurisdiction. Creditor
expectations may be linked more tightly to territorial assets. With regard to
bankruptcy treatment, this is a place where the gap between modified
universalism and virtual territoriality becomes quite wide. Corporate groups
pose a problem for the modified universalist, in that they undercut equality
of treatment, and lock in the asset/claim inequalities that pari passu
treatment washes away for a consolidated debtor. The universal
proceduralist would respect the corporate form and leave it at that. The
modified universalist would take a different approach depending on
whether the subsidiaries were truly operationally distinct or merely formal.
In the next section, I will explain why, as a practical matter, the divide may
not be as great as it seems, but for the moment, the difference seems quite
fundamental.
Corporate groups are not just a problem for equality of treatment. They
also complicate matters for centralized control. Officers and directors of
subsidiaries face a difficult question: should they answer to the corporate
parent and equity owner, or to local creditors (if the debtor is locally
insolvent)? These questions loom large for the modified universalist.
Should the interest of the group control the interest of the subsidiary? The
question is not complicated for the universal proceduralist. The duties of
directors and officers are determined by local law. The problem for the
universal proceduralist is whether centralized control and coordinated
governance is possible in the face of such conflicting duties.
But again, as I will explain in Part II, the difference may not be as great
as it seems. First, the clarity added by corporate groups may actually make
it easier to calculate a hypothetical territorial distribution, and hence a
baseline entitlement. This in turn will make it possible to distinguish the
territorial entitlement from the value that is created by coordinated
administration (and is a proper subject for bargaining). To the extent that
the value to the subsidiary (over and above the hypothetical territorial
distribution) can be quantified, this may actually help the directors explain
to local stakeholders and courts why it is the entity’s best interest to follow
the instructions of the corporate parent.
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D. ACTION ITEMS—CHOICE-OF-LAW INCURRENT
INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS
To the extent that it is deemed desirable to implement a choice-of-law
based approach to cross border cases as outlined above, it will be necessary
to make several adjustments to existing international instruments. The
Model Law does not discuss choice-of-law, and many civil law jurisdictions
that have adopted the Model Law might take the absence of authority as a
denial of the power to engage in a private international law inquiry. It might
be worthwhile for UNCITRAL to consider suggesting in its enactment
guide a provision empowering countries to engage in the sort of choice-of-
law inquiry described above where none exists under national law.
Similarly, Article 34 of the Legislative Guide calls for strict limitation to
the number of exceptions from the scope of bankruptcy law.67 Thus, if
choice-of-law is to be considered for purposes of distribution to secured and
priority creditors, then it might be useful to add a subsection to Article 34 to
govern cross-border cases. Finally, to the extent that these rules for locating
assets and claims make sense, it might also make sense for UNCITRAL to
undertake a project that would encourage harmonization around these rules.
II. WHY BOTHER?
Locating claims and assets can be difficult. Asking courts to apply
foreign law can be confusing. Westbrook has argued that seeking to do so
will not increase fairness and may undercut the goal of coordinated
administration of cross border bankruptcy rather than furthering it.
Hopefully, the discussion above demonstrates that the task is not a fool’s
errand. The question remains: why bother? What is to be gained from the
effort to locate claims and assets for the purpose of distribution? In this
section, I will argue that the benefit of a virtual territorial approach is that
(1) it will facilitate rather than hinder cooperation by limiting incentives to
forum shop; (2) it will provide a global distributional baseline for
determining best interests (Pareto optimality); (3) it will provide a global
basis for distinguishing pre-bankruptcy entitlements from bankruptcy-
created going concern value; and (4) it will mute the sovereignty objection
and thereby facilitate cooperation among courts.
Situating claims and assets is worth the trouble because it makes it
possible to calculate a hypothetical territorial liquidation that respects the
corporate form. This calculated hypothetical “local” distribution establishes
what a claimant would receive in the absence of a globally coordinated
administration. The amount that such a creditor would actually realize if
they resorted to local remedies is the baseline against which a proposed
67. UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVEGUIDE, supra note 5, art. 34.
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coordinated disposition can be judged. It also establishes the quantum of
firm value that is based on “entitlement,” and the benefits of coordinated
administration (or “transactional gain”) that is the proper subject of
bargaining.
A. THEABSENCE OFGLOBALCRAMDOWN
The generally accepted rationale for cross-border bankruptcy is that
coordinated governance of a multinational enterprise will maximize value
for stakeholders. 68 The greatest obstacles to value maximizing
restructurings are coordination problems and conflicts of interest. These
obstacles loom large in domestic cases, and even larger when one seeks to
coordinate the restructuring of a multinational enterprise. There is no
mechanism to bind (cramdown) dissenters across borders, and for that
reason most global reorganizations reach only financial creditors. Even
then, this coordination can only be achieved when the benefits of
coordination are very large. Therefore, the acid test of a global
restructuring regime is not the ability to gather assets, but the ability to
obtain recognition, across borders, of the automatic stay, and, even more
importantly, to bind a non-consenting claimant.
Comity and cooperation help in this regard, but, as has been discussed,
they require a local court to accept outcome differences that will often
implicate strongly held creditor interests and fundamental national policies.
The calculation of a hypothetical distribution in a territorial liquidation
provides the basis for a “justice” based claim to recognition, and undercuts
both the entitlement claims of local creditors and the sovereignty objection
of local courts.
B. GLOBAL BEST INTERESTS AND THEDISTRIBUTIONAL BASELINE
To confirm a Chapter 11 plan in the United States, one must satisfy the
so-called “best interests” test.69 Every creditor must receive at least what
they would have received in a hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation.70 In
cramdown, secured creditors are entitled to at least the liquidation value of
their collateral and unsecured creditors are entitled to their pro rata share of
the proceeds of the liquidated unencumbered assets before any junior
creditor can receive a distribution. 71 The condition is one of Pareto
optimality. It limits the cases where one can seek to reorganize, but it also
establishes the limit to one’s moral and legal entitlement to a firm’s value.
68. 11 U.S.C. § 1501(a) (2012).
69. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7).
70. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii).
71. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b).
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In a domestic bankruptcy, value above and beyond the liquidation value
is, in effect, created by the availability of a bankruptcy forum. While
creditors can force a liquidation using state law remedies, the ability to
preserve going concern value by reorganizing or conducting a going
concern sale is value created by federal bankruptcy law. 72 This same
distinction between liquidation-based entitlements and bankruptcy created
going concern value can be made with even more moral force in cross-
border cases with regard to territorial entitlements. When a cross-border
enterprise fails, local creditors have the power to compel the liquidation of
local assets, but not more. The cross-border bankruptcy architecture created
by the Model Law, EU Reg and other international instruments is what
creates the possibility of rescue or coordinated liquidation.
This recognition of the limits of territorial entitlement goes a long way
toward minimizing the practical difference between the universal
proceduralist and the modified universalist. The modified universalist fears
that recognition of local entitlements will give local creditors a veto over
the treatment of local assets, or that local asset inequalities will hamstring
consensus on a coordinated disposition. This may be true in cases where the
benefits of coordination are small, but in such cases coordinated
administration may not actually be worth the trouble. The cases where
coordinated administration is important are the ones where the firm’s going
concern increment exceeds the costs of coordination.
The cost of territorialism is that this increment of value will be lost
because of the problem of territorial holdouts. The cost of modified
universalism is that this value may also be lost if secondaries must be
opened and outcome differences cause ancillary courts to resist or cooperate
only after a considerable fight. Unfortunately, neither cramdown nor Pareto
optimality are enshrined in the cross-border architecture. Local liquidation
value is not stated as a baseline entitlement, and there has not been a
mechanism, until now, to impose this limit on a non-consenting local
creditor.
The genius of the proposed amendments to the EU Reg is that the
combined effect of the undertaking contemplated by Article 18(1), and the
discretion granted to the local court by Article 29a(2) to decline to open a
secondary is to provide just such a mechanism for binding non-consenting
foreign creditors to decisions made in the main case. The prerequisite is
compliance with the global best interests standard described above.
This Pareto optimality condition stands in sharp contrast to the “rough
wash” in return for “transactional gain” rationale for comity in cross-border
72. Melissa Jacoby and I have made this point in a more detailed and systematic fashion
elsewhere. Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, Ice Cube Bonds: Allocating the Price of
Process in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Cases, 123 YALE L.J. 862, 925 (2014).
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cases. The modified universalist instead turns to Kaldor-Hicks based
efficiency claims, and these are hard sells when the institutions for
enforcement are weak, as they are in the cross-border context. 73 The
concept of the hypothetical territorial liquidation, offered by the virtual
territorialist, offers a way to render the cross-border apparatus consistent
with the usual bankruptcy criterion of “best interests.”74 This is particularly
important where the court at the debtor’s COMI must obtain cooperation
through persuasion rather than command.
C. THE PRACTICAL POLITICAL EFFECTS OF AGLOBAL BEST
INTERESTS TEST
To make the point of the preceding section more concrete, creditors
often base their objections to reorganization on a supposed legal
entitlement, without realizing that legal entitlements have different practical
values in different contexts. This point is most easily demonstrated in
connection with a secured creditor who claims ownership of collateral and
objects to any disposition that she does not approve. As a practical matter,
her security interest may have a variety of values depending on the manner
of disposition. As a legal matter, in a cross-border case, a secured creditor
only has the power to insist on a territorial foreclosure under the procedures
of local law. An unsecured creditor only has the power to levy on assets and
sell them on the courthouse steps. It may be possible to obtain a higher
value for these assets if sold as a group, or if not sold at all, but this is not
necessarily value that the creditor has the power or right to realize.
One does not want purely theoretical legal entitlements to stand in the
way of a cooperative coordinated solution that would grant them a greater
actual distribution. The hypothetical territorial liquidation baseline gives the
debtor in the main case the ability to move past rough wash to transactional
gain in the individual case. The administrator can call the objector’s bluff
and say, “This is what you’d get if we liquidated. We’re offering you at
least that much.”
Where courts are involved, the ability to calculate a hypothetical
territorial liquidation also makes it possible to decide whether it is in the
best interests of the estate to open a secondary case, and to decide whether
the debtor’s proposed disposition of the estate complies with the
undertaking described in proposed Article 18(1) of the EU Reg. Under the
Model Law knowing the hypothetical territorial distribution would allow an
73. The condition of Pareto optimality requires that everyone be made better off, while the
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criterion requires only that society as a whole be made better off, even if
some members of society are made worse off.
74. See Edward J. Janger, Virtual Territoriality, 48 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 401 (2010).
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ancillary court to determine whether creditors’ expectations are being
sufficiently protected.
Once a distributional baseline has been calculated, however, it is
possible to distinguish claims of entitlement based on ownership of or
control over a portion of the estate from negotiations over reorganization
value (that only exists as a result of the ability to arrange a coordinated
cross-border disposition of those assets).
D. FORUM SHOPPING
In addition to establishing a distributional baseline, granting the main
proceeding the power to offer foreign creditors at least their hypothetical
territorial distribution reduces the stakes associated with forum choice and
the incentive to open secondaries. Therefore, to the extent that debtors still
engage in forum shopping, it is more likely to be based on the efficiency of
a nation’s bankruptcy statute and the expertise of a nation’s bankruptcy
courts than it is to be based on strategic gaming. Finally, to the extent that it
is necessary to open a secondary or ancillary proceeding, the incentive will
derive from the needs of estate administration rather than attempts to
capitalize on priorities or creditor rights available in the secondary
jurisdiction.
E. RESPECTINGNATIONAL POLICYCHOICES
Differences among bankruptcy laws exist for a reason. Bankruptcy law
allocates the cost of business failure among various constituencies, and
different countries take different views of how these losses should be
allocated. Some countries think it is essential to fully protect employees.
Others care deeply about fraud victims, tax claimants, tort claimants, and so
on. The relative priority positions are different, but not necessarily
idiosyncratic. They have expressive content, and they also reflect a balance
that is dependent on rights and entitlements that may exist elsewhere in the
legal system. Similarly, governance rights are allocated differently in
different systems. Some bankruptcy cases are run for the benefit of
shareholders, some unsecured creditors, some secured creditors, etc. Again,
this allocation of governance rights is likely to be considered, and may be
balanced against other policy choices contained in the nation’s business
laws. Allowing the main court to respect the distributional baseline
described above also carries with it a respect of the policy choices made by
other countries.
F. CORPORATEGROUPS AND THECORPORATE FORM
The concept of global best interests based on a hypothetical territorial
distribution also provides a way for cross-border bankruptcy to manage and
address the problem of corporate groups. It both limits the effects of asset
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inequality and limits the scope of conflicting duties faced by directors of
territorial subsidiaries.
1. Equality of Treatment
Indeed, Collins & Aikman was a group case, and the promised territorial
distributions in that case were based on the existence of subsidiaries in the
relevant countries. By locating claims and assets, and indeed subsidiaries, it
was possible to centrally administer a case at the debtor’s COMI while
respecting the corporate form. 75
One concern about the virtual territoriality/synthetic secondary
approach raised by Westbrook and also by Irit Mevorach is that recognition
of the corporate form with regard to assets and claims may elevate form
over substance for many firms that are functionally and operationally
centralized at the group-COMI. 76 Indeed, many groups manage cash
centrally, and Westbrook has described territoriality, in such situations, as
creating a sort of “asset roulette.”77 Using a “territorial liquidation” standard
as the baseline for entitlement considerably limits the extent to which this
will be a problem. A territorial claimant asserting local priority or security
would bear the burden of establishing that the particular asset would be
available for liquidation in the territorial case. This would considerably
reduce the size of such entitlements, and hence, the bargaining leverage of
the claimants against the subsidiary.
2. Governance: Clarifying Directors’ Duties in Reorganization
Cases
Another problem that has bedeviled cross-border bankruptcy cases is
that where a firm organizes through territorial subsidiaries, the fiduciary
duties of the directors, and potential obligations for wrongful trading may
demand that they open a secondary case, while they may receive
instructions from the corporate parent not to do so, and instead to cooperate
with the global case. Again, if one can calculate a hypothetical territorial
distribution, and promise to honor that distribution and/or share a portion of
the reorganization value, then the local directors can justify their decision to
follow instructions emanating from the main case by stating that it is
maximizing value for the local claimants against the local subsidiary.
75. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
76. Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Breaking Away: Local Priorities and Foreign Assets, 46 TEX.
INT’L L.J. 601, 606–09 (2011); Irit Mevorach, Cross-Border Insolvency of Enterprise Groups: The
Choice of Law Challenge, 9 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 226, 232–34 (2014).
77. Symposium, International Insolvency Symposium: The Priority Dilemma, 46 TEX. INT’L
L.J. 437 (2011) (quoting Professor Westbrook’s spoken remarks).
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CONCLUSION
In sum, the goal of this essay has been twofold. First, I seek to establish
that it is practically possible within a centrally administered case to
calculate a hypothetical territorial distribution that can be used to establish a
distributional baseline for claimants across jurisdictions. Second, I argue
that this hypothetical territorial distribution, based on a choice-of-law
approach, should form the basis for establishing the Pareto optimality of
distributions in a coordinated administration. This ability to distinguish
local liquidation value from going concern value will allow the debtor to
quantify the transactional gain associated with cross-border cooperation,
and further to quantify the transactional gain obtained by each claimant.
This ability to distinguish claims based on entitlement from claims that seek
to reallocate reorganization surplus will reduce the cost of comity, as
differences of outcome should disappear as a political and moral
consideration
